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Abstract 
This study examined the effect of response format on the conclusions drawn in a categorical 
reasoning task. In Experiment 1, participants were required to respond in either a multiple-choice 
format or were required to produce their own conclusion (without any choices presented). In the 
multiple-choice task, people responded with a wider variety of conclusions, more No Valid 
Conclusion responses, and had a smaller forward bias. In terms of theoretical predictions, Mental 
Model Theory was better supported in the multiple-choice condition and more conclusions 
corresponded with initial models in the production task while more conclusions corresponded 
with alternative models in the multiple-choice condition. The predictions made by the 
Probabilistic Heuristic Model were not affected by the conditions; however more min 
conclusions were found in the production task than the multiple-choice condition, and there was 
an increase in the p-entailment heuristic for the production task. Experiment 2, which included a 
persistent reminder about No Valid Conclusions in the production task, showed that No Valid 
Conclusions increased greatly for the production task and there was no longer a difference in 
forward bias. Also, neither theory showed any cross condition differences now. 
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The Effect of Response Format on Syllogistic Reasoning 
Of critical importance to people’s ability to successfully navigate the modern world is the 
capacity for both logical and abstract reasoning skills. Without these skills, it would be very 
difficult to generalize and carry information from one task to another. This would make learning 
difficult and time consuming. One of the types of reasoning that people use on a daily basis is 
categorical reasoning, which is used to find links between known information in order to derive 
connections with different pieces of information. The goal of this study was to discover what 
mechanism is likely at work when people perform categorical reasoning. In particular, this paper 
looked at changes in the kinds of conclusions that are drawn when an individual is confronted 
with different types of response formats. The conclusions drawn from these syllogisms will, in 
theory, reflect the kind of reasoning used and whether or not the type of reasoning changes with 
the response format. 
Categorical Syllogisms 
Categorical reasoning is a type of deductive logic that typically consists of two premises 
that make claims about various groups and their relations with one another. In a syllogism, these 
groups are typically represented by terms (e.g., A, B, or C), and quantifiers (i.e., All, Some, No, 
or Some… not) that are used to describe the relation these groups have with one another in 
statements called premises. For example, a pair of premises may state that ‘All B’s are A’s’ and 
that ‘Some B’s are C’s’. These premises can be combined to form a syllogism that can be used to 
express a deductive argument. In such an argument, there will be two terms that appear once in 
the entire argument (i.e., the end terms: A and C) and one term that appears twice (i.e., the 
connecting term: B). Below is an example of a syllogism presented in a standard format: 
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All B’s are A’s 
Some B’s are C’s 
Therefore? 
All reasoning performed on categorical syllogisms is deductive. It is important that people 
assume that both of the premises are true when trying to determine a conclusion, otherwise the 
premises would be violated. This means that a conclusion must be necessarily true given the 
premises that are presented in a syllogism. From the above premises, one can deduce that ‘Some 
A’s are C’s’. To illustrate, if every B is an A, and if some of those B’s (which are A’s) are C’s, 
then it follows that at least some A’s must be C’s. However, it should be noted that it is possible 
that people could respond that ‘Some C’s are A’s’. The end terms can appear in either order, as 
long as the conclusion still holds true (this is discussed further below).  
Categorical syllogisms can also come in several possible forms, and some have no 
deductively valid conclusion. Here is an example that is similar to the previous syllogism but in a 
different form: 
 All A’s are B’s 
All C’s are B’s 
Therefore? 
Notice that the terms in the premises are both in different orders and the quantifiers have also 
changed. Unlike the previous syllogism, there is No Valid Conclusion for this syllogism. This is 
because unlike the previous syllogism, there are no answers that must be correct regardless of the 
possibilities. For example, it is possible that in addition to all A’s being B’s, all A’s are also C’s. 
It is also possible though that while A’s and C’s are B’s, they are still mutually exclusive of each 
other (for example, chairs and tables are both furniture, but no chair is also a table). 
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This shows that there are several different orderings or syllogistic figures possible for the 
same syllogism. There are four syllogistic figures that premises can be placed in. These are AB-
BC, AB-CB, BA-BC, BA-CB, and each represents a figure (i.e., ordering of terms in the two 
premises) that each premise could take. For example, the first syllogism above would be 
syllogistic figure BA-BC because both premises describe the linking term (B) at the beginning. 
The second syllogism would be syllogistic figure AB-CB because the first premise has the end 
term (A) in front and the second premise has the end term (C) first. 
Finally, conclusions can be phrased with the terms presented in either order. For example, 
someone could derive a conclusion of ‘All A’s are C’s’ or ‘All C’s are A’s’. While these are not 
equivalent statements, the point is that it is possible for a conclusion to be written either in a 
forward or a reverse order. For example, in the following syllogism: 
All A’s are B’s 
All B’s are C’s 
Therefore? 
the conclusion can be framed as being either ‘All A’s are C’s’ (which is a valid conclusion) or 
‘All C’s are A’s’ (which is not a valid conclusion). The first is in a forward order because the 
terms appear in the conclusion in the same order they appear in the premises (i.e., A-C); the 
second conclusion is in a reverse order because the terms are in the opposite order as they appear 
in the premises (i.e., C-A). Different orderings can affect a conclusion’s validity in some 
syllogisms, as in this example. However, in the first example above, order did not matter. 
As stated earlier, in most research involving categorical reasoning, there are four possible 
quantifiers (All, Some, No, and Some… Not) that can be used in the two premises with each 
individual premise using one quantifier. When the four quantifiers are combined with the four 
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possible syllogistic figures, there are 64 possible combinations of syllogistic figures and 
quantifiers. Out of the 64 possible syllogisms, only 27 have valid conclusions with the rest 
having No Valid Conclusion. 
Methods of Testing Syllogistic Reasoning 
Similar to how there are different ways to design a college exam, there are a number of 
different ways that syllogistic reasoning can be tested. One way is to present the premises of a 
syllogism and to ask people to produce their own conclusion. An example of this is a set of 
experiments conducted by Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) in which participants were asked to 
produce a conclusion from a given set of premises. In this experiment, participants were 
presented with cards that had single premises written upon them. After both of the premises were 
presented, the individuals then drew conclusions from scratch and wrote them down upon a piece 
of paper. Similar methods were also used by Goodwin and Johnson-Laird (2008) using transitive 
and pseudo-transitive inferences instead of straight forward categorical syllogisms (e.g., A is a 
blood relative of B, or A overtook B) and Jahn, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2007) which looked 
at how models were used in reasoning with spatial layouts.  
One of the benefits of using a production task is a significant change in relative difficulty, 
which can be used to test how a theory holds up under tougher conditions. This is because all 
conclusions must be generated by the participants themselves. This increases difficulty because a 
production task requires additional resources (e.g., Copeland & Radvansky, 2004). However, a 
drawback of using a production task like this is that it may increase the difficulty of some tasks 
to the point that it can create floor effects. As participants try to derive a conclusion and try to 
determine the best solution to a problem, the difficulty of a problem could likely make it harder 
to render any decision of merit. In this scenario, people may not be able to come up with a 
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conclusion on their own. It may also cause participants to respond in unorthodox ways that are 
not score-able. For example, an individual may give an illegal answer using a quantifier not used 
in the task (e.g., “most” or “few”) or draw a conclusion using the connecting term instead of the 
end terms (e.g., ‘All A’s are B’s’ or ‘Some C’s are not B’s’). 
A second technique that can be used to present syllogisms is to present them in a 
multiple-choice format. In this manner, the premises are presented and followed by a set of 
choices. Participants are asked to select the conclusion they thought best fit a given syllogism 
from the list of all nine possible conclusions. This method was used by Copeland and Radvansky 
(2004) and Copeland (2006) using all nine conclusions in a computer based test, and earlier by 
Dickstein (1978) who limited the choices to the conclusions that were in a forward order (i.e., 
this study omitted the four conclusions that are in a reverse order) or a response of No Valid 
Conclusion. This method allows researchers to score the task more effectively and quickly than a 
production task as multiple-choice requires far less interpretation than a production task and can 
often be scored mechanically. It also helps to systematize most scientific tests by ensuring that 
there is no possibility of an illegal response, because people must respond with one of the 
presented choices. However, some drawbacks are that multiple-choice tests may promote 
guessing because it can be easier to simply guess than it is to use reasoning.  
There has been little research done to see if there is a difference between response 
formats. Hardman and Payne (1995) tested the production, multiple-choice and a third type of 
response format called a verification task against each other; the latter task involves asking 
people to evaluate whether a particular conclusion is true. In their second experiment, they 
presented a subset of the total 64 possible syllogisms to participants and asked them to either 
verify a conclusion that was presented with the syllogism, select from a list of five possible 
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answers (as used in Dickstein’s (1978) study), or to produce their own conclusion from scratch. 
They found that there were differences between response formats with the greatest difference 
being between verification and the two other tasks. There were a number of limitations with this 
study. First, this study only used 42 of the 64 possible syllogisms. Second, the multiple-choice 
format was limited to only five choices as opposed to the full nine. Finally, this research was 
conducted in 1995 and so it did not examine some of the more widely accepted theories of today.  
To our knowledge no research has been done to see if different theories of reasoning 
could be supported depending upon which format is used. For example, it could be that the 
reason one study provides support for one theory while it does not support another may have 
little to do with actual explanatory power, but more to do with the way participants are asked to 
respond. As mentioned before, this change may affect the difficulty of the task and could affect 
the kinds of strategies that are used to solve them.  If this is the case, it can be assumed that the 
two are not compatible with one another. Further, it is possible that Hardman and Payne’s (1995) 
study might have unduly limited the options by restricting the number and type of syllogisms 
used. In order to fully vet a theory of reasoning, the full set of 64 syllogisms should be examined. 
Because these theoretical explanations are an important part of understanding syllogistic 
reasoning, the next section explains the two most prominent theories. 
Mental Model Theory 
According to Mental Model Theory, reasoning is based upon representations that are 
mentally constructed (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird, 1999; Bara et. al. 2001). The 
first thing an individual does is to interpret the information from the premises and use that 
information to construct a mental representation of what was described. After that first step, the 
individual then interprets the information in the next premise, and then combines the new 
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information with the model that has already been constructed. This process can be made more 
difficult if the premises are in a syllogistic figure where the order of the terms is not conducive to 
constructing a straightforward mental model. For example, the syllogistic figure AB-BC is 
straightforward because people can construct a model with A’s and B’s using the first premise, 
and then can connect the C’s to the existing B’s when interpreting the second premise. For the 
syllogistic figure BA-CB, people may prefer to start model construction with the second premise 
then the first, because the B’s would then be linked when considering them in that manner. 
Therefore, construction of the model may need to wait until one or both of the premises have 
been converted into a syllogistic figure that is easier to deal with. This can be taxing on memory 
resources (Capon et al., 2007; Copeland & Radvansky, 2004). Once the transformation is 
complete, the individual then combines the separate information from both premises to form a 
new model. This process of transformation and augmentation is continued until all the premises 
are included in a final model. 
Upon finishing the creation of a mental model, people can now form a conclusion. This 
conclusion can then be tested by attempting to build alternate models of the same premises that 
contradict the conclusion. The difficulty of this process is primarily determined by the number of 
models that can be produced from the same premises, with more models increasing the difficulty. 
If no model is constructed that can contradict the conclusion, then the conclusion is accepted. 
However, if the conclusion is contradicted, people will attempt to find another conclusion that 
fits the premises or else decide that there is No Valid Conclusion. It should be noted that some 
studies have shown that people have a tendency to rely on only a single model; in other words, 
even though more models may be possible, many people may not try to construct alternative 
models (e.g., Newstead, Handley, & Buck, 1999). 
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There are several predictions that can be made based on this theory (Johnson-Laird & 
Bara, 1984). One prediction is that there will be a preference for conclusions that are in the 
forward order (a forward bias). This is because producing a forward biased conclusion is less 
taxing in general than producing a reversed conclusion due to the fact that people generally read 
the ‘A’ premise first before reading the ‘C’ premise. As the syllogism is read, people will tend to 
construct the premises as they are read and so the model becomes oriented in a form that is read 
A-C rather than C-A. In addition, due to the difficulty of building multiple models, it is very 
difficult to completely verify a conclusion. This makes it more likely that the individual will fail 
to think of all the possible mental models that can be created from a set of premises, which 
would make an individual less likely to correctly respond with an answer of No Valid 
Conclusion and answer with an answer that may not be valid. 
Probabilistic Heuristic Model 
Recently, there has been a movement to describe many mental operations as being a 
series of probabilistic judgments rather than based on mental models or formal logic rules 
(Chater & Oaksford, 1999). The Probabilistic Heuristic Model looks at reasoning as being more 
akin to the use of fast and frugal heuristics based on probabilities rather than the complex and 
difficult task of manipulating mental tokens as proposed by Mental Model Theory. 
The first step an individual takes, according to this theory, is the generation of a 
conclusion using a set of heuristics to help create a conclusion that is probably valid (Chater & 
Oaksford, 1999). There are three heuristics that can be used, the first of which is the min-
heuristic. This heuristic favors the quantifier that is the least informative. For example, according 
to this theory, the quantifier ‘All’ is more informative than the quantifier ‘Some’, and ‘Some’ is 
more informative than ‘No’ which is more informative than ‘Some… Not’. The quantifier that 
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the first heuristic favors is called the min quantifier. For example, out of the two quantifiers ‘All’ 
and ‘Some’, ‘Some’ would be favored because it is less informative than the quantifier ‘All’. 
Once this quantifier is determined, then it becomes the preferred quantifier to be used in the 
conclusion. The second heuristic is the P-entailment heuristic. After determining the min 
quantifier, an individual will then try to figure out, using the least informative premise, what 
other conclusions will most likely also be true. For example, if the min heuristic leads to a 
conclusion that all A’s are C’s, then it is likely (P-entailed) that some A’s are C’s. Thus, this 
second heuristic can also be used to derive the quantifier that is used to create the conclusion. 
The last generation heuristic is the Attachment Heuristic. This heuristic is used to determine the 
order of the terms in the conclusion. This heuristic will attach the quantifier from the min 
premise (i.e., the premise with the min quantifier) to the term of the most informative premise 
unless the quantifier from the min premise has the last term (usually C) as its subject. For 
example, if the last premise of a syllogism is “Some C’s are not B’s” then the attachment 
heuristic will attach the min premise (Some…Not) onto the term C rather than the term A. 
However if that premise was instead “Some B’s are not C’s” then attachment will occur with the 
term A and not C. 
There are two test heuristics that are employed by an individual to test if a conclusion that 
has been derived is likely to be true. The first test is called the max-heuristic. This test 
determines how confident an individual is in a particular conclusion. This depends on the 
difference in informativeness between the min and the max premise. For example, if the most 
informative premise was ‘All A’s are B’s’ and the conclusion used the quantifier ‘Some…Not’ 
then the individual who made that conclusion would not be very confident in that answer due to 
the large difference in informativeness between the most informative premise and the 
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conclusion. However if the conclusion used the quantifier ‘All’ instead, then the individual 
would be much more confident and would likely respond with that answer. The second test is the 
O-heuristic. This test seeks to avoid producing ‘Some… not’ conclusions due to their lack of 
informativeness. The lack of informativeness tends to make the individual uncomfortable with 
the conclusion. This means that when a conclusion is especially uninformative (as a ‘Some… 
Not’ conclusion would be), then the individual will want to reject the conclusion and respond 
with No Valid Conclusion. 
As can be seen in the above description, the Probabilistic Heuristic Model differs from 
Mental Model Theory. According to Mental Model Theory, people use the quantifiers to 
represent the terms, and to then determine their relationships to one another. However, according 
to the Probabilistic Heuristic Model, people make probabilistic judgments about what is more 
likely based solely on the quantifiers that are presented. These differences lead Probabilistic 
Heuristic Theory to predict different conclusions than Mental Model Theory. The Probabilistic 
Heuristic Model can be used to make several predictions. Due to the attachment heuristic, an 
individual would be almost just as likely to produce a conclusion that is in a forward direction as 
in a reverse direction. Also, due to the probabilistic nature of the heuristics, there is more room 
for variation. This means that there would likely be a larger variety of answers that would likely 
be given in any group.  
While there is a lot of research on categorical syllogisms (Chater & Oaksford 1999; 
Copeland 2006; Copeland & Radvansky 2004; Dickstein 1978; Johnson-Laird & Bara 1984), 
there has only been one study (Hardman & Payne, 1995) that made a direct comparison of the 
response format methods used in most research to see if they are indeed comparable to one 
another. However, as pointed out earlier, that study needs to be expanded and updated by using 
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the full set of syllogisms, the full set of responses, and by examining performance in the context 
of more recent theories. Without a comparison, there is no reason to assume that the conclusions 
drawn by one study will be either compatible or comparable to the conclusions of another study.  
Experiment 1 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether or not there are significant differences in 
answers that tend to be given between multiple choice and production task formats. In 
Experiment 1, this was tested by having different groups of undergraduate students answer a full 
set of 64 categorical syllogisms. The two groups were required to answer the question by 
indicating the correct answer from the list of answers (i.e., multiple-choice format) or by typing 
it in themselves without the inclusion of the list of possible answers (i.e., production format). 
The two theories in question have led to the following hypotheses. First, these response 
formats will differ in the number of conclusions given per syllogism with multiple-choice having 
a wider variety of answers given. This is because multiple-choice will have all the possible 
answers displayed and this should encourage participants to consider different answers. The 
number of No Valid Conclusions should be higher for the multiple-choice condition than the 
production task for much the same reason as the last prediction. The answers being displayed on 
the screen in the multiple-choice condition should lessen the working memory load for this 
condition, allowing people to try different solutions. Along this line, because the production task 
taxes working memory more, fewer answers should be considered and there should be a larger 
forward bias. 
 With regard to the theories, it is predicted that the amount of support a theory has will 
depend largely upon the answering format. One prediction for Mental Model Theory is that 
participants will rely on the initial model more often in the production task than in the multiple-
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choice condition, mainly because the former is more taxing on working memory. A second 
prediction is that additional models will be more likely to be considered for the multiple-choice 
condition than the production task. This is because the presence of the choices will increase the 
likelihood that participants will try to falsify their conclusions, and will reduce the difficulty 
because the participants no longer must store the information separately in working memory.  
For the Probabilistic Heuristic Model, the number of conclusions corresponding to the 
min heuristic should be greater with the production task. Also the number of p-entailment 
conclusions should also increase with the production task relative to the multiple-choice task. 
This is because the participants had to both come up with and remember their conclusion during 
the reasoning process. This should create higher difficulty levels, which participants would 
respond to by using p-entailment. This is because a participant might go with a weaker 
conclusion that has a higher likelihood of being true than a stronger, more informative 
conclusion. Or, to state it more simply, people may be more likely to guess with a highly 
probable conclusion when the task is more difficult. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students (24 males, 24 females) from the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas participated. All of them participated for partial credit in a psychology 
course. Ages ranged between 18 and 34 years with a mean of 20.9 years.  
Materials and Procedure 
The materials included all 64 possible categorical syllogisms. Each syllogism used the 
words ‘Hikers’ and ‘Readers’ as the end terms and the word ‘Swimmers’ as the connecting term. 
For example: 
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All Hikers are Swimmers 
All Swimmers are Readers 
Therefore…? 
These hobby terms have been used in past studies (e.g., Copeland & Radvansky, 2004) to ensure 
that each premise and conclusion could be considered plausible. 
Each participant used a standard computer for all testing and were instructed to determine 
conclusions using no additional materials (i.e., no paper or pencil was allowed). Also, the order 
of the presented syllogisms was randomized for each participant. Each participant signed the 
standard consent form and was then instructed on the basics of syllogisms. For example, they 
were told what terms are, what a quantifier is, and what a syllogism is. Then they were taught 
what a conclusion is, how to create one, what kinds of orders a conclusion could take, and what 
makes a conclusion valid. However, they were not given any information on the basics of 
solving categorical syllogisms (i.e., they were not provided any information about strategies) nor 
were there practice problems for the participants prior to testing. 
After all the instructions were read, the participants began working on the problems, 
completing all of them in one sitting. Each participant was randomly placed into either the 
multiple-choice or the production task condition. In the multiple-choice condition, each 
participant was required to select the conclusion they thought best fit the premises in the 
syllogism from the list of the nine possible conclusions. For example: 
1) All Hikers are Readers 
2) All Readers are Hikers 
3) Some Hikers are Readers 
4) Some Readers are Hikers 
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5) No Hikers are Readers 
6) No Readers are Hikers 
7) Some Hikers are Not Readers 
8) Some Readers are Not Hikers 
9) No Valid Conclusion 
In contrast, for the production task, participants were asked to type in the conclusion they 
thought was correct given the premises into a dialog box without the presence of the possible 
conclusions. Only data from participants that provided legal conclusions (i.e., conclusions using 
one of the 4 quantifiers and containing the two end terms) were scored. The answers were 
categorized as to the type of answer given (e.g. ‘All A’s are C’s’ or ‘No C’s are A’s’).  
The data was collected and used to find several measurements. First we analyzed the total 
number of conclusions that were given for each syllogism. This was found by tallying the 
number of conclusions that received at least one response (i.e., from at least one participant) for 
each syllogism. We also looked at the number of No Valid Conclusions given per syllogism. 
Finally we computed the forward-bias by taking the number of responses that were in a forward 
order (A-C) and subtracting the number that were found to be of the reverse order (C-A). 
Accuracy was also measured as the number of correct responses (out of 64). 
Results and Discussion 
All analyses were conducted as item analyses (see Table 1), matching them for the two 
conditions (multiple-choice / production). To compare the variability of responses, the number of 
different conclusions given by participants was determined for each syllogism. For example, if 
for a particular syllogism, 21 participants responded with “All A are C”, 3 responded with “All C 
are A”, and no other conclusions were given by participants, then this syllogism would be scored 
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as a 2. If, on the other hand, at least 1 participant responded with each conclusion for a particular 
syllogism, then that syllogism would be scored as a 9 (because there are 9 possible conclusions). 
A paired samples t-test showed that people answered with a wider variety of conclusions for the 
multiple-choice (M = 5.94, SE = 0.15) than the production task (M = 5.33, SE = 0.19), t(63)  = 
3.51, p < .01; the reported means refer to the mean number of different conclusions per 
syllogism. People also were more likely to respond with No Valid Conclusion in the multiple-
choice (M = 4.23, SE = 0.33) than the production task (M = 1.88, SE = 0.25), t(63) = 9.95, p < 
.001; the reported means refer to the mean number of people responding with No Valid 
Conclusion for each syllogism. There was also a higher proportion of A-C conclusions given 
relative to C-A conclusions for the production (M = 8.56, SE = 0.94) than the multiple-choice 
task (M = 2.48, SE = 0.96), t(63) = 9.38, p < .001; the reported means refer to the mean 
difference score for each syllogism, subtracting the number of C-A conclusions from the number 
of A-C conclusions. Finally, people in the multiple-choice condition (M = 33.01%, SE = 2.99) 
were more accurate than those in the production condition (M = 24.74%, SE = 3.52), t(63) = 
7.21, p < .001. 
Because the goal of the current study was not to distinguish whether one theory may be 
better than the other, comparisons of the theories were not conducted (see Copeland & 
Radvansky, 2004, and Copeland, 2006, for direct comparisons of these theories). Instead, we 
focused on comparing the performance of a particular theory across the different response 
formats (see Table 2). The percentage of responses that corresponded to those predicted by 
Mental Model Theory was greater for the multiple-choice condition (M = 79.55%, SE = 1.22%) 
than for the production task (M = 74.59%, SE = 2.18%), t(63) = 2.94, p < .01. Participants were 
more likely to give an answer that corresponds to an initial model answer in the production task 
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(M = 60.00%, SE = 3.08%) than in the multiple choice task (M = 54.59%, SE = 2.79%), t(63) = -
2.97, p < .01. Finally the multiple-choice condition had more answers corresponding to multiple 
models (M = 25%, SE = 2.29) than the production task (M = 14.72%, SE = 1.96%) t(63) = 8.89, 
p < .001. 
The percentage of responses that corresponded to those predicted by the Probabilistic 
Heuristic Model did not differ between the multiple choice condition (M = 88.41%, SE = 1.16%) 
and the production task (M = 88.58%, SE = 1.5%), t(63)= 0.18, p = .854. However, the number 
of conclusions that corresponded to the min heuristic was greater for the production task (M = 
60%, SE = 3.08%) than the multiple choice condition (M = 54.59%, SE = 2.79%) t(63) = 2.97, p 
< .005, and the p-entailment heuristic was greater for the production task (M = 20.84%, SE = 
2.31%) than for the multiple-choice task (M = 16.19%, SE = 1.64%), t(63) = 2.59, p < .05. 
From the results above, it seems that a major cause of the differences seems to be that 
people in the production task are failing to invalidate their initial models (from Mental Model 
Theory) or are seeking weaker conclusions using p-entailment (from Probabilistic Heuristic 
model). From the standpoint of Mental Model Theory, this result is to be expected as the added 
work necessary in generating additional models while still remembering the conclusion one is 
trying to test is very difficult based on working memory limitations. So it seems that because of 
this difficulty participants are not trying to generate models beyond the first one. This effect is 
lessened in the multiple choice condition because the participant is no longer required to generate 
their own conclusions and furthermore, the constant presence of these choices encourages 
participants to try to falsify their conclusions more in order to come up with the ‘better answer’.  
Probabilistic Heuristic Model does not predict a difference in difficulty due only to the 
presence (or lack of) a list of choices. However, there is an increase in the usage of p-entailed 
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answers, which suggests that participants are weakening their conclusions in the production task. 
An explanation of this effect is that because the participants had to both come up with and 
remember their conclusion during the reasoning process, this created unusual difficulty levels 
that participants responded to by using p-entailment. This is because a participant might go with 
a weaker conclusion that has a higher likelihood of being true than a stronger, more informative 
conclusion. 
As the results from Experiment 1 show, the two response formats are not equivalent in 
either the descriptive data or the theory predictions. This means that any results from one 
experiment are not equivalent to another unless both experiments use the same type of response 
format. These results could explain the differences seen between some of the studies that can be 
found in the literature and perhaps explain why sometimes a theory is supported in one study and 
another theory in a different study. 
Experiment 2 
Of course, the fact that a difference exists does not explain why it exists. In Experiment 
1, it was suggested that the reason these results were different between the two methods of 
testing is because the participants are either forgetting or not attending to all the possible 
answers. For example, in the syllogism: 
Some A’s are B’s 
Some B’s are not C’s 
Therefore….? 
Someone should conclude that there is No Valid Conclusion. However, in the production task, 
because no choices are presented, it is possible that the reasoner may simply have forgotten that 
this response was a possibility and hence did not respond properly. In order to discover if this 
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was a possible cause of our results, we created Experiment 2. The goal of Experiment 2 was to 
examine this possibility by adding a persistent reminder regarding the possibility that some 
syllogisms may have No Valid Conclusion. It was predicted that this change would increase the 
likelihood that, according to Mental Model Theory, participants in the production task would try 
to falsify their initial models and consider alternative models. For the Probabilistic Heuristic 
Model, participants should consider additional heuristics beyond the min heuristic and p-
entailments than they did in Experiment 1. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight undergraduate students (17 males, 31 females) from the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas participated. All of them participated for partial credit in a psychology 
course. Ages ranged between 18 and 40 years with a mean of 20.5 years. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials used and the procedure was identical to Experiment 1 except that in 
Experiment 2, the production task included a persistent reminder that No Valid Conclusions were 
a possible response. This reminder was presented on the screen with every syllogism. The 
multiple-choice condition was identical to Experiment 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The analyses for Experiment 2 (see Table 3) were similar to those conducted in 
Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we found that the variability was still significantly higher in the 
multiple choice condition (M = 5.62, SE = .16) than the production task (M = 5.06, SE = .16), 
t(63) = 3.02, p < .01. As predicted, the number of No Valid Conclusions increased in the new 
production task with the production task (M = 4.23, SE = .40) now being greater than the 
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multiple choice condition (M = 3.43, SE = .38), t(63) =  3.44, p < .01. There was no longer a 
difference between the amount of forward bias for the multiple choice (M = 5.25, SE = 1.11) and 
production task (M = 5.98, SE = 1.09), t(63) = 1.14, p = .26, nor was there a difference in 
accuracy between the multiple choice condition (M = 32.23%, SE = 3.33%) and the production 
task (M = 32.94%, SE = 3.34%), t(63) = 0.47, p = .64. 
The same comparisons from Experiment 1 were made for the predictions of Mental 
Model Theory and the Probabilistic Heuristics Model (see Table 4). There were no longer as 
many differences between the two conditions for either theory. For Mental Model Theory, there 
was no difference between the multiple choice condition (M = 78.73%, SE = 1.53%) and the 
production task (M = 76.98%, SE = 2.17%), t(63) = 1.00, p = .32 regarding the percentage of 
responses that corresponded to its predictions. There was also no difference between the 
prevalence of initial model answers in the multiple choice condition (M = 55.80%, SE = .304%) 
and the production task (M = 53.77%, SE = 3.48%) t(63) = 1.15, p = .26, nor the usage of 
additional models between multiple choice (M = 23.03%, SE = 2.63%) and the production task 
(M = 23.19%, SE = 2.41%) t(63) = 0.11, p = .91.  
For the Probabilistic Heuristics Model, overall there was no difference between the 
multiple choice condition (M = 88.53%, SE = 1.24%) and the production task (M = 90.55%, SE = 
1.39%) t(63) = 1.36, p = .18. There was no difference between the usage of the min heuristic 
between the multiple choice condition (M = 55.8%, SE = 3.03%) and the production task (M = 
53.77%, SE = 3.47%) t(63) = 1.14 p = .25 nor was there a difference in the p-entailment heuristic 
between the multiple choice condition (M = 18.47%, SE = 1.98%) and the production task (M = 
19.02%, SE = 2.26%), t(63) = 0.36, p = .72. 
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As the data from Experiment 2 showed, one of the major causes of the differences in 
Experiment 1 seems to be that participants were either forgetting or failing to attend to the 
possibility of a No Valid Conclusion when the production task was used. This is seen in the fact 
that there was a difference in both the number of No Valid Conclusions and also in the slight 
difference in the total number of conclusions drawn. Indeed, it seems that simply adding the 
reminder that there can be No Valid Conclusions had an effect on all measurements we used, 
though the differences in forward bias may simply be caused by an overall decrease in 
conclusions other than No Valid Conclusion.  
General Discussion 
The current study examined whether there was a difference between the production task 
and the multiple-choice conditions when participants performed categorical reasoning. We 
predicted that there would be differences between the two conditions in the types of conclusions 
drawn, and that these differences would show in the theories. The results showed a difference 
between the two conditions when looking at the conclusions drawn, particularly in regards to No 
Valid Conclusions and the forward bias. These differences disappeared when persistent 
reminders about No Valid Conclusion being a possible response were added, suggesting that 
memory or awareness effects were a possible primary cause. This means that the two response 
formats are not equivalent and so experiments with one format should not be directly compared 
with another experiment that used a different format. Consistent with this idea, the current study 
showed that these differences could actually affect the amount of support a theory can receive 
from the data. Fortunately, it seems that reminders may control the differences somewhat. 
This study went beyond Hardman and Payne’s study (1995) in several ways. First, in the 
previous study, Hardman and Payne sought to control the answers participants gave by limiting 
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the number of syllogisms to only those that would elicit a forward bias and restricting the list of 
conclusions in the multiple choice condition to those of a forward bias, whereas the current study 
did not make any restrictions and used the full 64 possible syllogisms and all nine possible 
conclusions. Second, the original study did not look into the effects these different response 
formats have upon any theories of reasoning. In contrast, the current study examined the effects 
of these response formats on two prominent theories of reasoning, the Probabilistic Heuristic 
Model and Mental Model Theory. 
With regard to both theories of reasoning, it should be noted that differences in format 
may have actually changed the strategies people use. With reference to Mental Model Theory, 
there was a large increase in the use of additional models when participants were in the multiple-
choice condition. This suggests that participants’ working memory was being taxed, and in 
response participants were not able to be as thorough in their search for additional models. When 
all of the possibilities were presented in the multiple-choice condition, however, participants 
began to create additional models in order to try to falsify their prior conclusions. This difference 
in additional models was very clear in the current study which suggests that Mental Model 
Theory should seek to explain this effect in newer implementations. This is especially true 
because the level of support varied with the use of additional models, which suggests that this 
effect is very important in the reasoning process.  
As far as the Probabilistic Heuristic Model is concerned, there was little change between 
conditions except that p-entailment usage was increased in the production task. This suggests 
that when the task is more difficult, participants might be weakening their conclusions for a 
conclusion that is more likely to be acceptable. Relative to Mental Model Theory, the effects of 
response format on the predictions of the Probabilistic Heuristic Model were far less pronounced. 
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This suggests that the theory may be a more complete theory that might be capable of explaining 
more response formats than Mental Model Theory. There were still differences in the usage of p-
entailment though and this should be examined further in future studies.  
Conclusion and Future Directions 
These findings should be considered in future research in order to prevent confounds 
from reducing the validity of valuable research. This study showed that one cannot look at 
Johnson-laird and Bara’s (1984) results, which used a production format, and make direct 
comparisons to the data from Chater and Oaksford’s (1999) study, which used a multiple-choice 
format. However, this does not mean that only one response format should be used in all research 
though. As people perform reasoning in many different formats in real life, research should also 
include several types of formats. Furthermore, all theories of reasoning should be able to 
adequately explain the differences in answers given in all response formats. If participants 
answer a question differently in one format than in another, a good theory of reasoning should be 
able to explain why this is so. However, researchers should keep in mind that a study that uses 
one response format is not comparable to another. 
Further research should be directed toward looking at what other factors may cause the 
differences between response formats. For example, it may be worth examining whether the 
persistent reminder used for No Valid Conclusions will have similar balancing effects when used 
to remind participants about forward bias. It may also be worth looking into the possibility that 
participants could be using different reasoning strategies depending upon the situation. It is 
suggested that additional research could be used to discover if that is a possibility. 
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Table 1 
The number of conclusions drawn per syllogism, No Valid Conclusions, amount of forward bias, 
and accuracy in Experiment 1 (Standard Error in parentheses) 
      Multiple-Choice Production 
Number of Conclusions   5.93 (.15)  5.32 (.18) 
No Valid Conclusions    4.23 (.33)  1.87 (.25) 
Forward Bias     2.48 (.95)  8.56 (.93) 
Accuracy     33.01% (2.99)  24.74% (3.52) 
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Table 2 
Percentage of responses that correspond to predictions made by Mental Model Theory and the 
Probabilistic Heuristics Model in Experiment 1 (standard error in parentheses) 
      Multiple-Choice Production 
Mental Model Theory (Overall)  79.55% (1.22)  74.59% (2.18) 
Initial Model     54.59% (2.80)  60.00% (3.09) 
Second or Third Model   25.00% (2.30)  14.72% (1.96) 
 
Probabilistic Heuristics Model (Overall) 88.41% (1.16)  88.58% (1.50) 
Min Heuristic     54.59% (2.80)  60.00% (3.09) 
Probabilistic Entailment   16.19% (1.64)  20.84% (2.32) 
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Table 3 
The number of conclusions drawn per syllogism, No Valid Conclusions, amount of forward bias, 
and accuracy in Experiment 2 (Standard Error in parentheses) 
      Multiple-Choice Production 
Number of Conclusions   5.62 (.16)  5.06 (.16) 
No Valid Conclusions    3.43 (.37)  4.32 (.40) 
Forward Bias     5.25 (1.1)  5.98 (1.08) 
Accuracy     32.23% (3.32)  32.94% (3.33) 
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Table 4 
Percentage of responses that correspond to predictions made by Mental Model Theory and the 
Probabilistic Heuristics Model in Experiment 2 (standard error in parentheses) 
      Multiple-Choice Production 
Mental Model Theory (Overall)  78.73% (1.53)  76.98% (2.17) 
Initial Model     55.80% (3.04)  53.77% (3.48) 
Second or Third Model   23.03% (2.63)  23.19% (2.41) 
 
Probabilistic Heuristics Model (Overall) 88.53% (1.24)  90.55% (1.40) 
Min Heuristic     55.80% (3.04)  53.77% (3.48) 
Probabilistic Entailment   18.47% (1.98)  19.02% (2.26) 
 
 
